On the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Since I’m bored and since I want to show off my keen thought process, and since it gets harder and harder to think of new ideas to post about, I’ll post my response to this question on Facebook even though it’s a bit trivial in my eyes. At least it’s a bona fide academic issue. The question is…


From AI Copilot to keep it concise, accurate, and neutral.

The evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) is a thought-provoking philosophical argument brought forth by Alvin Plantinga. The crux of this argument is that holding both naturalism (the belief that everything arises from natural properties and causes, with no supernatural intervention) and evolutionary theory simultaneously leads to a sort of cognitive dissonance1.

Here’s a simplified version:

  1. Reliability of Cognitive Faculties: If both evolution and naturalism are true, our cognitive faculties (like perception and reasoning) have developed solely through natural selection aimed at survival, not necessarily at producing TRUE BELIEFS.
  2. Low Probability: Given this, Plantinga argues that it is improbable (or at the very least, inscrutable) that our cognitive faculties are reliable in delivering TRUE BELIEFS.
  3. Self-Defeating: Therefore, if you believe in naturalism and evolution, you have a good REASON TO DOUBT the reliability of your own cognitive faculties, which consequently gives you a REASON TO DOUBT the very belief in evolution and naturalism itself.

This argument raises interesting questions about the intersection of EPISTEMOLOGY (the study of knowledge) and evolutionary biology. What do you think of this argument? Does it spark any new thoughts or challenges for you?

https://en.wikipedia.org/…/Evolutionary_argument…


And here’s my answer.


I’ve heard this argument before, so it doesn’t spark anything new for me. While I don’t believe in so-called naturalism aka physicalism aka materialism (but I do believe in biological evolution, but I don’t think the process is entirely blind or entirely physical), I think the argument is fairly weak. The problem is that it’s very possible, likely even, that being cognitively apt at navigating our environment and such also leads to being able to infer true things about our environment. Simply speaking, wouldn’t it be easier/more likely/more efficient/more effective for the mind to navigate its environment if it holds true beliefs? In other words, there’s probably a strong correlation between which beliefs/models/etc. are useful/effective and which are true, because truth is inherently useful, and nontruth is misleading/misguiding.

Or, we can say that a mind capable of abstract, general thought/intelligence to the degree that humans have would, as a side effect, likely be able to infer the truth about things most of the time…especially since our intellect is not only skilled with respect to our environment, like the other animals’ minds more or less are, but it’s generalized and abstract, which means its being able to navigate its natural environment is just one relatively “arbitrary” or specific application of its general ability, so it should be equally adept at doing other things it sets out to do, such as inferring truths, or even creating the sophisticated, unnatural technology we see all around us, which is very unrelated or indirectly related to the natural environment we evolved in.

And the means we’d use to determine objective truth (if there can be said to be such a thing; see https://myriachromat.wordpress.com/2020/10/28/is-there-objective-truth/ and https://myriachromat.wordpress.com/2022/01/19/the-truth-is-not-out-there/) would be science, scientific instruments, scientific hypotheses/theories/laws/models, peer review, experimentation, prediction and observation, cross-validating observations via different senses and/or different scientific instruments, and scientifically or philosophically compensating for the known weaknesses and peculiarities of our own biological sensory apparatuses, brain processes, cognitive biases and propensity for logical fallacies, etc.

And thirdly, if the premise is true, then our entire notion of truth is necessarily fundamentally based in utility. In other words, there would be nothing that “truth” as far as we understand it—as far as everything we’ve ever thought of as being “true” goes—can mean other than that an idea is useful, so our models and beliefs we evolve or create for navigating reality would be more or less by definition “true.” I’ve written more about this point here: https://exalumen.blog/2024/08/13/on-pragmatism/.

Ps. You should “like” this post because I’m clearly a genius.

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