Frequency Illusion

“The Baader-Meinhof phenomenon, also known as ‘frequency illusion,’ occurs when something you’ve recently noticed or learned suddenly seems to appear more frequently, creating the illusion that its occurrence has increased.”

It’s unfortunate that the assumption that it’s merely an illusion is baked right into the name for it. The assumption is due to the deep-seated mechanicalism of our current culture which must deny synchronicity.

It’s merely an assumption, as there is no way to objectively quantify the likelihood of seeing something X number of times in Y timespan, nor the likelihood that the lack of memory of having seen it before is incorrect. (See https://myiachromat.wordpres.com/2020/10/30/how-many-coincidences-are-enough and https://myriachromat.wordpress.com/2018/04/13/notes-on-science-scientism-mysticism-religion-logic-physicalism-skepticism-etc/#Bias.)

The assumption is incorrect and denies one of the more prevalent signs of the magic and amazingness of life.

And the fact that it’s included right in the name for the effect makes the take seem much more authoritative to the undiscerning mind. We’re linguistic creatures, and names mean everything to us. Consider, for example, the child who asks his mom, “mom, what’s that thing in the sky?”, to which his mom replies, “that’s a rainbow,” and suddenly the child’s curiosity is satiated, even though all she did was give him an arbitrary name!

Particularly in politics, names of things, especially policies, are heavily designed to sound either more innocuous or more sinister. I’ve seen some good examples of this but don’t remember them off-hand. We need to be both more vigilant in seeing past the names of things and also more responsible in how we use the power of words and maybe inject our own biases when we name things, such as the “frequency illusion.”

Calling it the “frequency illusion” has a much stronger influence on one’s thinking that it’s an illusion than would calling it something more neutral and then mentioning the popular theory (or rather, speculation—it’s not even a “theory”) that it’s merely an illusion…

Idea #6 – A new parsing grammar and a new way of parsing with zero look-ahead or look-behind

I came up with a new, better alternative to BNF and EBNF for a syntax specification syntax, and then I found out something similar already exists, called PEG. I also came up with a novel algorithm for parsing (which I haven’t implemented, which is why I’m creating this writeup instead) and then discovered that something similar already exists, known as an LR(0) parser, such as in this paper: https://www.cs.clemson.edu/course/cpsc827/material/LRk/LR0.pdf. In this writeup, I’ll explain my own special grammar, which I’ll call EPEG (extended parsing expression grammar), and my own special parser, which I call GraphParser.

The idea behind EPEG, as with PEG, is to regex-like grouping, repetition, and other such features in a parser grammar. EPEG has everything PEG has and a few more things:

  • In addition to ?, +, and *, there are ??, +?, and *?, which capture the least amount possible as they do in regex.
  • There are {x} and {x,y} as in regex to repeat a clause x times or between x and y times.
  • You can specify a rule name within another rule by using :=, as in (BLAH* phew:=(FOO+ BAR))*?. This would simply give the expression that matches FOO+ BAR the label phew in the parsed tree if it follows an expression matching BLAH*.
  • You can specify a starting rule that will encompass the entire parsed text, for example by specifying start foo. By default the rule that encompasses the entire text is the first rule specified in the grammar.
  • The specification should probably include backreferences to previously captured groups like regex has, using \1, \2, etc. like in regex. The problem with that, though, is that we’d have to have both capturing grouping and non-capturing grouping like in regex, but the normal, non-capturing grouping used in PEG uses (), while () in regex is capturing and (?:) is non-capturing. I wouldn’t want to use (?:) for non-capturing and () for capturing because non-capturing would by far be the more popular usage and () is simpler to type and to read. And I wouldn’t want to reverse ()‘s and (?:)‘s roles because that would be confusing. So I’d have to figure something out.
  • I thought of allowing specification of regex tokens done in the same way as specification of EPEG tokens, and even allowing regex inside EPEG rules, but I decided against it, as it would mean my EPEG parser would have to parse on the character-by-character level, which would introduce some difficulties in both the implementation and the specification syntax, and would also be less efficient, at least if the parsing is down in a high-level language like I’d planned. Though if I weren’t lazy, I could just create a unique token for each regex specification and include it in the lexer definition…
  • There should be a way to specify “semantic actions” in both the parser and the lexer, but, IMO, the actual language used for the functions defined thereby should depend on the parser’s/lexer’s implementation and therefore should not be part of EPEG’s specification. But the syntax for associating the functions with the rules should itself be part of the grammar. Maybe the syntax could be that the code goes inside of {} right after the rule definition like in BISON.

My algorithm for the parser is…

  1. Convert the grammar to a graph. For example, if the EPEG code is
    foo = 'x' bar 'y'
    bar = 'a'*
    
    Then the graph will be a node beginning a rule called foo. which points to a node containing x, which points to a node beginning a rule called bar, which points to a node containing a, which points to itself and also to a node containing y, which is understood by some denotation to be outside of the bar rule and to be another part of the foo rule.
  2. Start following symbols in the graph one at a time, while reading the input tokens in the text to be parsed, and comparing them to the successive symbols.
  3. Wherever the graph splits, such as with the presence of an | (‘or’), follow both lineages simultaneously. For example, in the graph described above, if you were parsing xaay, the symbol in the graph that matches the first a would point to itself, as well as to y, so the next a would be compared to both the a node and the y node. (This example shows the clever way in which * is to be implemented.)
  4. Poll the next symbol for each of the paths currently being followed, until one of the symbols matches the next token.  The order in which the current paths are polled and compared to the next token depends on which rule has precedence in the grammar specification.
  5. Wherever one of the next symbols polled from the various paths doesn’t match the next token, drop that path from the list of paths currently being compared.
  6. If the next symbol in a path starts a rule and it matches the next token, then increment the stack pointer.
  7. Of course, if the next symbol is another rule specification, then poll the first symbol specified in that rule, which would be the node that node points to. Or, if that node points to yet another rule, then poll the first node pointed to in that rule, etc.
  8. Of course, if the rule has a |, then split the paths and poll all the next symbols, which are the first symbols on either side of the `|
  9. If the next symbol in a path ends a rule and it matches the next token, then decrement the stack pointer, and add the name of the rule and the sequence composing it to the current stack level.  The final output will be the sequence at stack[0].
  10. Each token encountered and matched is appended to the string of tokens currently pointed to by the current stack pointer.
  11. If a token doesn’t match anything in any of the current paths being followed, then of course report that the input is invalid/doesn’t adhere to the specified grammar.

So, in the grammar specification given in the PDF linked to, which was…

S = A '#'
A = 'a' A 'b'
    |  'c' 

it would…

  1. Poll ‘c’ and ‘A’ from the grammar in concurrent lineages, where ‘A’ expands to ‘a A b’, so your current symbols you’re polling to compare the next token to are ‘c’ and ‘a’.
  2. If the next token is ‘c’, collapse the ‘A’ rule and poll what follows it in the graph, the ‘#’
  3. If the next token after ‘c’ is ‘#’, then end, because ‘#’ is an end-state in the graph. (If there are further tokens to be read, report invalid syntax.)
  4. If the next token was ‘a’ instead of ‘c’, add one to the stack pointer, drop the ‘c’ lineage, and keep following the ‘a A b’ lineage, which would mean your next polled values are ‘a’ and ‘c’
  5. If the next token is ‘c’, go to 2.
  6. If the next token is ‘a’, go to 4.

So, if, for example, you had two nested |s in the grammar, that would generate a parsing graph that would make the parser compare each input token to four different graph symbols until one matches, for as long as the input text falls under both nested |s.

In the bar = 'a'* rule above, the a node would point to itself first, then to the y node. But, if the rule were bar = 'a'*?, the a node would point to the y node first, then to itself.
Similarly to how 'a'* would result in a node pointing to a first and then to the next symbol, while the pointers in 'a'*? would be in the reverse order, 'a'+?, 'a'??, and 'a'{2,3}? vs. 'a'+, 'a'? and 'a'{2,3} would also work by reversing the orders of the pointers.
'a'+ would be implemented the same way as a followed by 'a'*.
'a'{2,3} would be implemented in the same way as (aa)|(aaa) would.
'a'? 'b' would be implemented as a node containing ‘a’ that points to both the ‘b’ node and the node after it.
!('a' foo) would be implemented with a special node type starting the pattern that tells the parser it’s a ‘not’, so that if the entire pattern is exhausted while matching the input data, the parsing fails with a syntax error. The first node of the pattern would also point to what comes after the end of the pattern, so that once the matching fails, it can follow that pointer to continue.
&('a' foo) would be implemented with a special node type starting the pattern that tells the parser it’s an ‘and’, so that if the entire pattern is not exhausted while matching the input data, the parsing fails with a syntax error. The first node of the pattern would also point to what comes after the end of the pattern, so that once the matching succeeds, it can follow the pointer to continue.

I tried implementing this parsing algorithm in Python, but my brain kept melting while trying to pre-code the parsed tree for the specification of EPEG so that I could convert it to a graph so that I could parse EPEG grammars using the graph so that I could convert them to graphs so that I could parse code input based on specified EPEG grammars. So, somebody else will have to do it…

Proof that everything that can possibly exist does exist

This is an adaptation of the sixth bullet point under https://myriachromat.wordpress.com/2020/06/18/notes-on-existence-and-the-multiverse/.

  1. Whether something exists or not is a function of the contents of its greater physical and metaphysical context and history.
    1. For example, if a tree exists, it’s because another tree, which is or was likely in the same vicinity, dropped a seed sometime in the past, that was sufficiently nurtured as to grow into that tree. If a house exists, it’s because of the confluence of the desires and actions of many people in the context of a culture and civilization.
    2. All of the above things are dependent on the principles of physics, which ultimately exist for metaphysical reasons: you can’t empirically measure why all the laws of physics are as they are. For anything you can empirically measure, you can always ask why nature rendered that particular measurement for you as opposed to some other measurement.
    3. We can conclude by extrapolation/induction that whether the universe itself exists or not depends on some greater metaphysical context.
    4. We can also conclude this from the reasoning that, if it weren’t for some particular metaphysical context to determine the specific nature and contents of the universe, there would be nothing to make it exist in the particular way it does/with the particular contents it does as opposed to in any other particular way. In other words, there’s nothing to select from all the conceivable possibilities.
  2. Therefore, if there were the lack of any greater metaphysical context/history, either everything/every universe that can possibly exist would necessarily exist, or nothing would exist.
  3. If there is an absence of a greater metaphysical context to the universe, then neither is there something to determine which is the case between whether all conceivable possibilities are manifest or nothing at all is anywhere.
  4. The greater metaphysical context that determines that the universe exists, and which particular universe is the case, or alternatively, that all possible universes are manifest or nothing is, must itself have an even greater metaphysical context, or else there would be nothing to determine that that metaphysical context is the the way it is as opposed to any or all other possible ways.
  5. If that greater metaphysical context doesn’t itself have an even greater metaphysical context, or if this isn’t the case on any level of consideration/regress, then, in turn, there’s nothing to determine that only that metaphysical context exists as opposed to any and all metaphysical contexts existing and thus giving rise to all conceivable possibilities, or any reason that metaphysical context is the way it is as opposed to any other way, or any reason it would even exist.
  6. In the absence of a metaphysics to determine whether every possibility or no possibility is made manifest, either both possibilities come true (i.e., that every possibility is made manifest and nothing is made manifest), or neither possibility comes true (which would seem to to identical to nothing coming into existence, only on the next higher level of metaphysics/consideration).
  7. In such a case, it is not determined whether the first of the two above possibilities comes true (i.e., that every possibility is made manifest and nothing is made manifest), or the second of the above possibilities comes true (i.e., that comes into existence, only on the next higher level of metaphysics/consideration).
  8. This conundrum reaches backward into infinite regression; i.e., there would be the lack of a metaphysical context to determine if every possibility is manifest or nothing is manifest, and a lack of a metaphysical context to determine the nature of said metaphysical context, etc. ad infinitum.
  9. So, there would ultimately be nothing, no first cause or ultimately overarching state, to determine whether all possibilities are manifest or nothing is; it’s both both both and neither to infinite regression.
  10. It seems that, therefore, out of the infinite depths of metaphysical possibility, would spring both every conceivable possibility and nothing at all, where the “every possibility” is always one more level of consideration up from the “nothing” possibility. The metaphysical nature/foundation of what seems to exist would therefore be infinitely deep, as would the truth of whether it really exists or not, so it’s as if reality is a daydream within a daydream.
  11. If that’s the case, you may ask, why is it that we observe the “something” possibility rather than the “nothing” possibility? The answer is the same reason you observe the North Star but not the space between here and the North Star. Both exist simultaneously—everything an nothing—but of course the only one of the two you can ever notice is the everything.
  12. You may ask, why is it that we only observe a limited universe, instead of every conceivable possibility? The answer would be that every conceivable possibility includes those possibilities where perceivers can’t observe every possibility at once/from every vantage point. This universe, or biological life on Earth, is one of those possibilities.
  13. To be fair, so far we haven’t actually proven the lack of a greater and greater metaphysical contexts that would necessarily give rise to both all and no possibilities. It could be that there is an infinite or unlimited regress of greater and greater metaphysical contexts/histories, and that at the top, it’s ultimately determined that only one or a few possible universes/things/experiences are made manifest. But then, that consideration contains a contradiction: if there is an infinite/unlimited regress of metaphysical contexts, then there is no absolute top. And if there is no absolute top, what is there possibly to ultimately determine which conceivable possibility is made manifest as the universe we observe? Thus, that idea seems impossible.

One possible argument against this relates to my careful choice of the word “consideration” in the above steps. The argument would be that this entire argument exists in our consideration only, and as such as purely epistemological as opposed to ontological/metaphysical. (And, you could say, the concept of possibility isn’t a metaphysical or ontological one, but epistemological: that, in reality, there was only ever one possibility, which was that which happens.) But that argument would rely on the assumption that you can’t conclude anything about metaphysics based on purely epistemological deduction. And as I mentioned in the essay linked to at the top of this essay, due to both the absolute primacy and non-empirical nature of both metaphysics and epistemology, at some point metaphysics and epistemology are inextricable from each other.

Note bene: This argument does not exactly stipulate an infinite regress of physical and metaphysical contexts, which would beg the question, since that would be claiming existence of something. Note the words “in the absence of” above…it’s about an infinite regress of a lack of outer contexts. (This is again why the argument is primarily an epistemological one.) What really matters is that there’s nothing determining that the outermost context that actually exists, exists. But not even that really matters, because the argument does not actually depend on anything already observably extant to work; it just uses what we do know exists as a sort of trampoline or starting point/reference point for reasoning.

On Evolution

Somebody in a Facebook group says this:


I don’t believe in evolution.

Rather, I accept the overwhelming evidence that supports evolution. It’s not a belief. It’s science.
The theory of evolution stands as one of the most well-supported scientific principles, backed by an overwhelming abundance of evidence. Fossil records and genetic studies all reinforce the fact that species evolve over time.

We can also literally observe evolution. We see it in fruit flies and many other short-lived creatures. It’s not something one has to “believe in.” You can literally watch it happen.

Despite this, the term “missing link” persists, often misused to suggest that evolution is riddled with gaps or unresolved mysteries.

In reality, scientists have discovered numerous transitional fossils, including early human ancestors such as Sahelanthropus tchadensis (6–7 million years old), Ardipithecus ramidus (4.5 million years old), and Australopithecus sediba (1.9 million years old). These fossils, among many many others, vividly illustrate the gradual development of species over time.

What’s more, no fossil has ever contradicted the theory of evolution. Among the vast number of fossils we’ve discovered (and there are many), not a single one has provided evidence that challenges evolutionary principles.

In fact, every fossil can be considered a transitional form, exhibiting traits shared with other species, further illustrating the gradual changes that occur over time.
We can debate how or why species evolve — natural selection, genetic drift, gene flow, etc. — but we know species evolve


Here’s my response:


I’m so weary of people constantly denouncing belief or saying that the things they know/believe aren’t beliefs. Evolution may have overwhelming support behind it, and it may be true, but it’s still a belief. All we have are beliefs; some we just hold with certainty, which we call knowledge or truth, and they can also be more or less well-justified.

And your belief in evolution could be wrong, just like any of our beliefs. For example, can you prove you’re not a brain in a vat somewhere being fed a simulated reality that’s similar to some real external world except that it misleads you into thinking evolution is how species came to be? No, you can’t.

Furthermore, your belief in evolution is likely mostly true but false or misleading in certain crucial ways that make you closed to more-profound and beautiful truths about the world. For example, science can’t prove that the principles of random mutation and recombination, natural selection, etc. are sufficient to explain the fitness, diversity, and beauty of all the beings around us, or even the existence of consciousness. It’s possible, and I’d say likely, that there are more transcendental forces involved in addition to the principles we understand.

The refusal to accept the utility of beliefs or that one holds them is just hubris; people are just afraid to be associated with the possibility of being wrong.


See also https://myriachromat.wordpress.com/2017/01/22/knowledge-belief-doubt/.