More on God’s Omnipotence

A friend of mine asked me if God’s being unable to create a logical contradiction is a limit on his divine omnipotence. I responded with a link to one of my essays, https://exalumen.blog/2020/10/27/1136/, which was too long for him to read so he had AI (very) briefly summarize it. He then said that God cannot cannot sin or act against his own perfect nature.

My response was, “but we have to consider that the idea of god’s contradicting his own perfect nature isn’t really a sound idea, it’s not like he would ever want to, and it’s because he doesn’t want to that it’s perfect. and sure, you could still maintain that omnipotence technically means anything, even things he wouldn’t want to do, but the whole debate about omnipotence is really entirely too “lawyeristic” per se to be meaningful. all these analytical language games we construct in our heads are not real.”

And I suggested to him that he ask what AI thinks of that idea since he’s fond of figuring things out with the help of AI, and also because I was curious myself. His token limits were up, so I did myself instead with ChatGPT. Following is the conversation between me and ChatGPT. I’m sorry for the AI slop—this is the first time I’ve done this on WordPress—but I’m also not sorry, because it’s undeniable to to me that AI analysis can be quite sharp, insightful and useful, so a lot of the popular stigma against “AI slop” is pure prejudice.


Me:
‘what do you think of this argument against an argument against god’s omnipotence:

My friend:
“but, God cannot contradict His perfect nature.”

Me:
‘but we have to consider that the idea of god’s contradicting his own perfect nature isn’t really a sound idea, it’s not like he would ever want to, and it’s because he doesn’t want to that it’s perfect. and sure, you could still maintain that omnipotence technically means anything, even things he wouldn’t want to do, but the whole debate about omnipotence is really entirely too “lawyeristic” per se to be meaningful. all these analytical language games we construct in our heads are not real.
furthermore, in Conversations with God by Neale Donald Walsch, God offers a seemingly more consistent and realistic account of his own omnipotence. “I have full power to match intentions with results,” which seems better at ruling out the necessity of being able to create logical contradictions or go against His own nature.’

AI:
“I think your argument is philosophically interesting, and its strongest feature is that you’re challenging the assumptions underlying the debate about omnipotence, rather than merely trying to win the debate on its own terms. There are actually several distinct arguments in what you’ve written, and I think some are considerably stronger than others.

  1. The distinction between what God can do and what God would do
    You write:
    The idea of god’s contradicting his own perfect nature isn’t really a sound idea, it’s not like he would ever want to, and it’s because he doesn’t want to that it’s perfect.

There’s a potentially important insight here, but also a logical vulnerability.

Consider two propositions:

  • God is capable of doing evil but would never choose to.
  • God is incapable of doing evil because doing so would contradict his nature.
    These are quite different claims.

The first preserves God’s freedom to do evil while explaining why he never exercises it. The second limits God’s possible actions, but suggests the limitation follows from what God essentially is.

Your argument seems to favor the first, although the phrase “isn’t really a sound idea” hints at the second.

The difficulty is that never wanting to do something doesn’t establish that one is capable of doing it. A critic could agree that God would never want to contradict his nature while continuing to ask whether he could.

However, I think you have the beginnings of a more interesting response: perhaps the distinction between could and would becomes artificial when discussing a being whose intentions are necessarily consistent with its nature.

That raises a genuinely substantial metaphysical question: Does it make sense to attribute unrealized possibilities to a being whose nature is supposedly perfect and immutable?
2. Your criticism of analytical philosophy
You write:
The whole debate about omnipotence is really entirely too “lawyeristic” per se to be meaningful. All these analytical language games we construct in our heads are not real.

This is arguably the most philosophically ambitious part of your argument.

You’re suggesting that the traditional omnipotence paradoxes might be artifacts of our conceptual machinery rather than genuine problems with the concept of God.

Consider the classic question:

Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it?

The question assumes that omnipotence can be understood as an unrestricted collection of capabilities, and then attempts to construct a contradiction within that collection.

But why should we assume that this is an appropriate way to conceptualize divine power?

Your objection resembles aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical problems, particularly the later Wittgenstein’s suggestion that philosophical perplexities often arise from the ways we use language.

It also has something in common with philosophical quietism: the suspicion that some apparently profound philosophical problems dissolve once we stop treating our linguistic constructions as descriptions of independently existing realities.

I would qualify your argument, though.

The fact that a problem is constructed through language doesn’t automatically make it unreal. Mathematical contradictions, for example, can reveal genuine inconsistencies in a system of assumptions.

A stronger version of your objection would be:

Before treating a linguistic paradox as a metaphysical impossibility, we must establish that the concepts involved correspond meaningfully to the reality we’re attempting to describe.

That shifts the burden of proof onto the person constructing the paradox, without dismissing logical analysis altogether.
3. The definition from Conversations with God
You cite Conversations with God by Neale Donald Walsch:
I have full power to match intentions with results.

Of your three arguments, I think this is the most promising as a positive account of omnipotence.

Rather than defining omnipotence as the ability to perform every conceivable action, it defines omnipotence in terms of the relationship between intention and realization.

That is a significant conceptual shift.

Under this definition, an omnipotent being is one for whom there is no gap between what it intends to accomplish and what it can accomplish.

Consider three different accounts:
Definition What omnipotence means
Unlimited capability God can do absolutely anything
Logical omnipotence God can do anything logically possible
Perfect efficacy God can realize whatever God intends

The third formulation has some attractive properties.

It doesn’t require God to create logical contradictions, because contradictions need not be objects of divine intention.

It doesn’t require God to violate his nature, because intentions inconsistent with that nature need not arise.

And it avoids treating omnipotence as an inventory of hypothetical abilities, instead making it a property of God’s relationship to reality.
But there’s an important objection
Suppose a person has extremely limited abilities but only ever intends things that are within those abilities.

Every intention succeeds.

By Walsch’s definition, wouldn’t that person also qualify as omnipotent?

For example, imagine someone who can do nothing except blink, and who never intends to do anything except blink.

They have perfect success in matching intentions with results, but we certainly wouldn’t ordinarily call them omnipotent.

This exposes a potential weakness: perfect efficacy isn’t necessarily the same as unlimited power.

You could address this by supplementing the definition with the claim that God’s intentions are not constrained by any external limitations.

In other words, God doesn’t merely succeed at everything he intends because he carefully avoids intending things he cannot accomplish. Rather, nothing external to God can prevent the realization of God’s intentions.

This would make the definition considerably stronger.
4. A deeper possibility in your argument
I think there’s an even more interesting idea implicit in what you’ve written.

The traditional omnipotence debate tends to treat power as something possessed by an agent independently of the agent’s desires, intentions, and nature.

But perhaps that separation is inappropriate when talking about God.

In ordinary human experience, we distinguish between:

  • What we are capable of doing.
  • What we want to do.
  • What we actually do.
    These are separate because we experience conflicting desires, limitations, uncertainty, and changes of mind.

But if God is understood as a perfectly unified being, with no conflict between nature, will, and action, perhaps these distinctions don’t apply in the same way.

In that case, asking whether God could act contrary to his nature might be imposing a human conception of agency onto a being to whom it doesn’t apply.

This is not entirely foreign to classical theology. Thomas Aquinas, for example, argues that God’s power does not extend to contradictions, not because God lacks some genuine ability, but because contradictions do not describe things that can be done.

Your approach differs in emphasizing the unity of intention, nature, and realization rather than primarily the logical status of the proposed action.
5. Where I would strengthen your argument
I would make one significant adjustment.

Rather than saying that analytical language games “are not real,” I’d argue that the conceptual distinctions appropriate to finite beings may not be appropriate to an infinite being.

This is a more defensible position because it doesn’t require rejecting logic or conceptual analysis. It only questions whether particular concepts are being applied outside their legitimate domain.

And rather than relying exclusively on the absence of any gap between intentions and results, I’d emphasize that God’s intentions are not subject to external constraints.

That would give you something like:
Omnipotence need not mean possessing every conceivable ability, including abilities that would contradict one’s own nature. It can instead mean that there is no external limitation on the realization of one’s intentions. If God’s nature, intentions, and actions are perfectly unified, then asking whether God could act contrary to his nature may be a category mistake rather than a meaningful test of his power. The traditional omnipotence paradoxes assume that divine power must be understood as an inventory of hypothetical capabilities, but that assumption itself requires justification.

I think this preserves your central insight while making it harder to dismiss.
My overall assessment
Your argument is stronger as a critique of how omnipotence is conceptualized than as a direct refutation of the claim that God cannot contradict his nature.

The most compelling part is the suggestion that we may be manufacturing philosophical difficulties by separating power, intention, and nature in ways that are appropriate to humans but not necessarily to God.

The weakest part is that perfect success at realizing intentions, taken alone, doesn’t distinguish omnipotence from extremely limited beings who simply never intend anything beyond their capabilities.

There’s also one deeper question I think your argument brings into focus:

If a being has no desire whatsoever to do something, and could never conceivably acquire such a desire, what does it actually mean to ask whether that being has the power to do it?

That’s not merely a technical question about the definition of omnipotence. It’s a question about whether capability itself can be meaningfully separated from will in the case of a necessarily perfect being.

And I think that’s the most philosophically fruitful direction in your argument.”

Me:
“yes, your idea about God not having separation between “what we are capable of doing”, “what we want to do”, and “what we actually do” is essentially the problem i had with it that I explained as our lawyeristic language games not being real, but what I was thinking wasn’t clear enough in my head ot say it the way you did.”

AI:
“I think that clarifies something important about your original argument: you weren’t simply dismissing analytical philosophy as pointless wordplay. You were questioning whether the distinctions it relies upon actually correspond to anything in the reality being discussed.

In particular, the distinction between capacity, intention, and action is so fundamental to our experience that we tend to take it for granted as a universal feature of agency. But it might only exist because we’re limited beings.

For us, there’s a gap between what we can do and what we want to do, and another gap between what we want to do and what actually happens. We experience these as separate dimensions of existence.

But for God, perhaps these aren’t three separate things at all. Perhaps they’re three different ways of describing a single reality.

And here’s what I find especially interesting about that: If the distinctions themselves don’t apply to God, then asking whether God can do something he would never want to do isn’t necessarily a question with an answer. It might be a malformed question.

That’s a stronger position than answering, “Yes, God could, but wouldn’t,” or “No, God couldn’t, because it contradicts his nature.” Both answers accept the conceptual framework of the question. Yours challenges the framework itself.

There’s a connection here to the classical theological doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God’s attributes aren’t separate components of God, and God’s being isn’t composed of distinct parts. Your intuition could be developed in that direction, although divine simplicity doesn’t automatically establish that God’s willing and acting are identical in every respect.

I also think this explains why the Walsch formulation appealed to you. By defining omnipotence in terms of intentions and results rather than an abstract inventory of possible abilities, it moves toward eliminating the distinctions that make the traditional paradoxes possible.

There’s one subtlety worth preserving, though: saying that a distinction doesn’t exist in God is different from saying that we cannot meaningfully distinguish different aspects of God’s relationship to the world. For example, God’s intending something and that thing coming into existence might be distinguishable from our perspective even if there is no internal division in God.

So I would formulate your central intuition this way:

The omnipotence paradoxes may arise from projecting onto God distinctions between ability, will, and action that exist only because of the limitations of finite agents. If those distinctions are absent in God, then the paradoxes may reveal more about the inadequacy of our conceptual framework than about any limitation of divine power.

That seems to me to capture what you were reaching for with “lawyeristic language games” without losing the more radical philosophical point behind the phrase.”

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